[T]here are two registers of existence: the worldly one in which rewards and punishment are meted out on the basis of what people visibly do; and another one, inaccessible to mortal vision, in which damnation and/or salvation are distributed, as far as we can see, randomly and even capriciously.At Life's Private Book, David T. argues that Christ unites these two registers and lifts
the veil on the transcendent meaning of existence: we live in a fallen, sinful world in which the just suffer as well as the unjust. Damnation and salvation are not capricious. Damnation happens when we refuse to unite ourselves with Christ's redemptive act. Salvation happens when we accept the suffering the world visits on us; we do not accept the injustice of the world, but we accept that justice can truly only be found in the way of Christ.This is an excellent summary of the "paradoxical effect" caused by Christ's death. The problem that Fish has posed, however, requires us to focus on how "the veil on the transcendent meaning of existence" has been lifted. His question is whether the lifting of the veil can be an event in a narrative, whether it can be depicted. In other words, does the lifting of the veil, the "redeeming of the universe," have an observable effect on what still appears -- even after the lifting -- to be an "at best indifferent, and at worst hostile" universe? Do the roads to salvation and damnation have different scenery? Recall the opening to A Serious Man. The foreboding, the "dark comedy," the expectation with which the arrival and departure of Traitle Groshkover is narrated is left totally unresolved despite the presence of characters who clearly believe in dybbuks.
Fish began by describing the effect that the Coen's avoidance of "great cinematic moments" had on movie critic Dan Gagliasso. The "evenness [to the] movie’s treatment of its events" frustrates Gagliasso's "desire for something climactic and defining." Indeed, the evenness is so profound that, as Fish points out, heroism is "displayed by almost everyone, 'good' and 'bad' alike." Similarly, Peter Lawler pointed out that a "strange sort of cultivation" is distributed evenly throughout in the speech of illiterate men "raised on readings of Shakespeare and the King James Bible." If it is possible to narrate the "lifting of the veil," one would think that it is most likely amidst these men "who are more able to articulate who they are than we are." But think of how Hemingway, famous for a polysyndetic (and therefore "even") style derived, it is said, from the King James Bible, depicts characters who are virtuous because, according to Reynolds Price, "any form of stop would diminish . . . their grip on the rim of their own abysses." Reviewing Robert Alter's Pen of Iron: American Prose and the King James Bible last year in The New Criterion, Barton Swaim observed:
Alter is right that Hemingway’s style can grate over the course of a novel, and that it works best in the shorter form. The reader gropes in the dark to find his bearings, to find some circumstance or outcome with a plain meaning. By contrast, one of the reasons Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead is so satisfying is that she finds a way to use a reticent, intermittently paratactical style without depriving the reader of moral direction—and indeed her novel is shot through with biblical associations. (emphasis mine)Again, the question is whether a satisfying "moral direction" is part of the narrative or something offered along with the narrative. Robinson's book is "shot through with biblical associations" -- this observation calls to mind another relevant part of Fish's review (which I have already discussed here):
This and other pieces of scripture don’t emerge from the story as a moral kernel emerges from a parable; they hang over the narrative . . . never quite touching its events and certainly not generated by them. There are no easy homiletics here, no direct line drawing from the way things seem to have turned out to the way they ultimately are. While worldly outcomes and the universe’s moral structure no doubt come together in the perspective of eternity, in the eyes of mortals they are entirely disjunct.Does not the reward that Christ speaks of in Matthew 5:43-48 --
Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust. For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans the same? And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? do not even the publicans so? Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.-- does not this reward also only "hang over" any narrative that is not itself the Gospel? Fish's observation is not that "damnation and salvation are capricious" in the "perspective of eternity" but rather that their distribution is capricious "in the eyes of mortals."
David's argument is that the mortal eyes of one who has accepted the way of Christ include the perspective of eternity just as their wounds may redeem the universe when united with His suffering. To get at what I think is the core of Fish's article, however, maybe a better question is whether it is possible to portray the moment of salvation in the course of a "real" (Hemingway, not Dante) narrative. And, to return to Gagliasso's objection to the Coen's style, whether the cultivation of "great cinematic moments" would not similarly betray the material of narrative. Put another way: Is it possible to imagine an artist's rendering of the Transfiguration having as much of an effect on Dostoevsky as The Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb? Christ's face "did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light." Is there anything in that description or in a corresponding painting that is as performative as a picture of a decomposing Christ?
7 comments:
An excerpt from Rowan Williams' Dostoevsky:
"The credibility of faith is in its freedom to let itself be judged and to grow. In the nature of the case, there will be no unanswerable demonstrations and no unimprovable biographical form apart from Christ, who can only be and is only represented in fiction through the oblique reflection of his face in those who are moving toward him. And the question will never be resolved as to whether faith's capacity to survive disillusion and apparent failure . . . is a mark of resourceful self-deceit or the power of truthfulness."
Some interesting, possibly related thoughts (on Moby Dick in this case) have been posted in the comments to this First Thoughts post.
Brian writes: "It is my understanding that the more conventional interpretation (or maybe just the way I was taught it) is that the whiteness of the whale reflects the blankness, the indifference, the absence of consciousness in the universe. This is referred to in the quote given in the linked article and is made seemingly fairly clear in several other parts of the book. Ahab is obsessed with personalizing the utterly impersonal (the whale, and the universe, could care less about him) and is driven mad with this obsession."
Lars Walker: "Yes, this is God seen from Job’s point of view–the leviathan who (seemingly) rampages through our world and blesses or destroys capriciously (or so it appears from the human point of view). The idea that God is just and loving comes from revelation–our experience is more ambivalent and tragic. Ahab, I think, is a post-Christian who still believes in, and even desires, God, but has lost hope in grace. He would draw out Leviathan with a fishhook."
Michael Hannon, writing at First Things:
In a recent documentary on Eastern Christian monasticism, NYU’s Norris Chumley asked a monk in the Ukraine if God speaks to him in prayer. “He does not speak to me,” the monk answered, “because he has already said everything, through the Gospel and through the works of the Holy Fathers, of the saints.” Such a response might sound borderline blasphemous to contemporary Christians. And yet, this answer reflects perfectly the consensus of the Church over the past 2,000 years. In general, it seems that God provides the graces people need to serve him in whatever station of life they occupy. (Via Siris)
Mattie's final words as True Grit ends: "Time just gets away from us."
For Ricoeur, resignation is the first step -- in the aftermath of nihilism -- beyond the desire for consolation via theodicy and toward a repetition of faith.
An excerpt from Religion, Atheism, Faith:
Nietzsche also gave the name "consolation" to the great desire, "the greatest hope": that man might overcome himself. Why did he refer to this hope as consolation? Perhaps because consolation bears in itself the notion of deliverance from feelings of revenge. "For that man be delivered from revenge is for me the bridge to the highest hope, and a rainbow after long storms." Deliverance from vengeance is at the heart of our meditation on consolation, for vengeance means: "Where once was suffering, punishment must appear." Heidegger comments in the following manner: vengeance is an activity which opposes itself and is degrading--though not primarily and fundamentally in a moral sense. The critique of vengeance is not itself a moral critique. The spirit of vengeance is directed against time, against that which passes. Zarathustra says: "This, yes, this alone is vengeance itself, resentment of the will against time and its this was." Vengeance is the will in self-opposition, and hence, resentment against time. The fact that time passes is the catastrophe which causes the will to suffer and on which the will takes revenge by denouncing that which passes because it passes. To overcome vengeance is to overcome the negation within the affirmation.
Daniel McCarthy, writing at @TAC:
There’s an all too easy answer to the question of why bad things happen to innocent people — the evils of his world, great as they seem in the light of our mortal lives, are nothing compared to whatever reward (or punishment) awaits in the next. The immortality of the soul and the scale of eternity can erase any transient suffering in this life, or so the logic goes. But this is cold comfort, and the reason it’s cold comfort raises a more difficult question. The things that matter to us are all limited and mortal; our knowledge and experience of them occurs only within the parameters of mortal, earthly existence. An immortal, unearthly existence, whatever else can be said for it, is not one that much resembles the world or people we love in our fragile, time-bound lives. The joys of reunion with lost loved ones in the afterlife are some solace to grieving families in the here and now, but the more the mind considers a different plane of existence in an entirely different context from the one we know, where even the self has lost the horizon of experience, the less appealing it becomes.
From an article by Joseph P. Fell in Research in Phenomenology:
What is this "home," this "destiny"? [Heidegger's interpretation of Zarathustra's "convalescence"] It is reached via an overcoming of "revenge . . . the will's aversion to time and its 'It was'." . . .
What, then, is the time of this destiny and of this home? . . . One’s destined time, as a mortal dwelling on the earth, is the coming on of what has been out of the future. The overman must pass the test of being able to affirm a time in which there will be nothing essentially new or novel; his time is a time of finite possibilities. Research in Phenomenology 15 (1):29-41, 37
Jack Burden's marriage to Anne Stanton is like an American dramatization of this return home. As I said in the post on '90s Country, it is like the revelation of the "how [via love] that time remains in this time!" in the midst of the anguished "how did that time become this time?"
de Lubac, writing in The Drama of Atheist Humanism:
Some argue that [Dostoevsky's] bad characters, the deniers, stand out admirably in these books, whereas the good, the virtuous, the believers are commonplace figures . . . But, as we noted in the case of Myshkin, the characters of the second type are not always so insignificant! If their coloring is rather pale and their gestures sometimes clumsy, is there not a simple reason for that? Heaven has always been less easy to paint than hell; but that does not mean the painter has a greater belief in hell than in heaven . . . (368)
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